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person who has performed the services. Even if the compensation
were measured by quantum meruit, the problem would still arise as
to the value of the service to the promisor. As one court so aptly ex-
pressed it:
There are things which money cannot buy; a thousand
nameless and delicate services and attentions, incapable of being the
subject of explicit contract, which money, with all its peculiar
potency, is powerless to purchase.
The law furnishes no standard whereby the value of such
services can be estimated, and equity can only make an approxima-
tion in that direction by decreeing the specific execution of the con-
tract.15
It is believed that the minority view granting specific performance
reaches a more equitable result because the promisee receives what
he bargained for and avoids the problem of measuring the value of
intimate companionship and personal attention.
ROBERT A. PALuMIER
TAxA~ioN-ExcIsEs-Is "GREENS FE" FoR MiNATuRE GoiF T~xAmB
As Am.nssioN? Plaintiff operated a miniature golf course located
within a fenced area. A person desiring to play golf had to pay a fee
of forty cents, which entitled him to the use of a golf ball, a putter,
and the course. Persons who did not desire to play were permitted
to circulate through the course without restriction, and without fee
or charge. Plaintiff contended that these fees for the privilege of
playing on the miniature golf course did not constitute "admissions to
places of amusement or entertainment" under Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 138.020 and therefore were not subject to the state
excise tax on the sale of such admissions. In a declaratory judgment
action brought by the proprietor of the miniature golf course, the
circuit court held that such fees were taxable. On appeal, judgment
was reversed by a divided court, five to two. Spotlight Miniature Golf,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 279 S.W. 2d 795 (Ky. 1955).'
The portions of the excise tax statute involved here are Kentucky
Revised Statutes sections 138.010(2) and 138.020(1) (1953). Section
138.020(1) imposes an excise tax upon "the sale of admissions to
places of amusement or entertainment", subject to certain exemptions
not important here. Section 138.010(2) defines places of amusement
or entertainment as including:
"Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101, 114 (1876).
' Rehearing denied. June 24, 1955.
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...theatres, ball parks and stadia, lecture halls, dance halls, night
clubs, skating rinks, public bathing places, and all places of other
sorts, whether like the above mentioned or not, at which businesses
providing amusements or entertainments, or both, for which a charge
is made are operated.
Since this statute had not previously been interpreted as to the
point is issue, the court considered several decisions by the federal
courts interpreting the federal admissions tax statute.2 These cases
involved charges at a skating rink,3 a swimming pool,4 an amusement
park to ride a merry-go-round, 5 and a public bathing beach. 6 In all of
these cases, the fees charged were determined to be admissions, and
taxable under the federal statute.
In the case at hand, on the question whether the miniature golf
fee constituted an admission taxable under Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 138.020(2), the Kentucky court pointed out that in the enjoy-
ment of amusements or entertainments there is almost always involved
a use of equipment or facilities in addition to the privilege of being
admitted to an area. As stated by the court, "It is obvious that some-
where there is a dividing line between what constitutes an admission
to a place of amusement or entertainment, and what is merely a fee
for the use of an amusement or entertainment device."7 This dividing
line was then defined by the court to be: ". . . If the predominant
feature of the amusement or entertainment is the operation by the
patron of equipment or an artifical device, then the fee must be con-
sidered a use charge rather than an admission charge."8 Thus by pro-
nouncement and use of this theory of predominance, the court decided
that fees for playing miniature golf constitute a use charge, and there-
fore are not subject to the excise tax.
The court discarded the reasoning of United States v. Koller 9
(skating rink), and other similar federal cases by reason of the fact
that they involved skating rinks and public bathing places which
were specifically included within the Kentucky statute, while the ques-
tion under consideration involved a "place" not specifically included.
For this reason, the court stated that the federal interpretations could
not afford any basis for extending the application of the Kentucky
statute.
" INT. REV. CODE, of 1939 see. 1700 et seq.
'United States v. Koller, 287 Fed. 418 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
'Twin Falls Natatorium v. United States, 22 F.2d 308 (S.D. Ia. 1927).
'Fritz v. Jarecki, 189 F. 2d 445 (7th Cir. 1915).
Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).
7 Spotlight Minature Golf Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 279 S.W. 2d 795, 797
(Ky. 1955).
8Ibid. Supra note 3.
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However, a reading of the Kentucky statute indicates that the
legislature itself extended the application, and intended to tax this
type of event. The clause specifically enumerating certain taxable
activities is followed by the general clause, ".. . and all places of other
sorts, whether like the above mentioned or not, at which businesses
providing amusements or entertainments, or both, for which a charge
is made are operated." (Emphasis supplied). If any significance is
to be attached to this sweeping language, a miniature golf course
should be a "place" within Kentucky Revised Statutes section 138.-
010(2). Could the language of the statute be any stronger? As stated
by the Kentucky court in Hampton v. Commonwealth.,10 "It is an ele-
mentary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to
every word, clause, and sentence of a statute."
Ejusdem generis, which limits the general clause in a statute to
subjects like these specifically enumerated in that same statute, should
not be applied where a contrary purpose by the legislature is clearly
manifested." Here the legislature said "whether like the above or not."
At best the doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction,
and should not be used to subvert legislative intent.'2 Certainly a
reasonable construction of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 138.-
010(2) would indicate that the legislature, by use of the language
and all places of other sorts, whether like the above mentioned
or not. .. ," intended to expand the scope of the tax levy.
On careful analysis, it appears that the court held the tax not to
apply for two reasons:
(1) A miniature golf course is not a place of amusement. Since
miniature golf was not specifically included in Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 138.010(2), and since the general clause, because of
ejusdem generis, could not bring it within the scope of the statute,
the course was not a place of amusement. The court refused to allow
the general clause to extend the statute to cover golf courses because,
in the court's language, "none of the places specifically mentioned in
KRS 138.010(2) are of the type in which operation of some device or
equipment by the patron, as a participant, is the predominant fea-
10257 Ky. 626, 78 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1934).
n Vansant v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 1, 224 S.W. 367 (1920).
" Phelps v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 318, 272 S.W. 743 (1925); Mills v.
City of Barbourville, 273 Ky. 490, 117 S.W.2d 187 (1938); Jefferson County
Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County ex. rel. Grauman, 278 Ky. 68, 128 S.W.2d 230
(1939); City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815, 159 S.W.2d 1015 (1942);
Burke v. Oates, 293 Ky. 563, 169 S.W.2d 608 (1943); Steinfield v. Jefferson
County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614, 229 S.W.2d 319 (1950). In each of these
cases, the principle is pronounced that ejusdem generis will not be applied where
there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose by. the legislature.
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ture."13 Yet skating, which is specifically mentioned in the statute, is a
participating sport just as is miniature golf. They are strikingly similar
in that each requires an artificial device, in one case skates and in the
other golf club and ball, and each requires a prepared area to utilize
the device. Therefore, the reasoning given by the court for the
restrictive interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statute section 188.-
010(2) is somewhat less than convincing. It is submitted that this
was not a proper instance for the application of the ejusdem generis
rule of statutory construction. The court did not have to "read the
intent" into the statute-it was already there.
(2) The fee charged was not an admission. By development of the
theory of predominance, explained supra, the court determined that
the fee was a rental charge for golf equipment rather than an ad-
mission. An objection which could be made to the advancement of
this theory by the court is that it will render the tax burden on
amusement and entertainment establishments somewhat uneven. The
distinction between admission to a skating rink, and rental of a golf
putter is very superficial; yet one is a taxable event while the other
is not. If the use of a putter and golf ball is the predominant feature
of a charge to play miniature golf, might not the use of a pair of
skates be the predominant feature of the enjoyment of a skating rink?
The federal court in the Koller case stated, ". . . the 'skating ticket'
charge is clearly shown to be, not a charge for skates, but rather a
charge for admission to the skating floor .... ,,14
A reasonable conclusion from the inclusion of skating rinks in Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes section 188.010(2) would be that since a charge
at a skating rink is so similar to a rental charge (and possibly would be
subject to tax-exempt status under the theory of predominance), the
intent of the legislature was to tax admissions to all places of amuse-
ment, whether or not the fee was for a use or rental of equipment. As
pointed out in Atlantic Coast Line v. Commonwealth 5 "..*. the taxing
statutes are framed to produce revenue, and must be given a reason-
able construction-not one that 'squeezes everything out of the statute
which unyielding words do not perforce retain' ... "
EUGENE C. ROEMELE III
"a Supra note 7 at 797.
" Supra note 3 at 421.
"802 Ky. 36, 41, 193 S.W. 2d 749, 752 (1946).
